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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1s an appeal from the district court's "Opinion on Appeal," the 
"Judgment and Order Re: Contempt" finding Mr. Jones guilty of one count of 
contempt and imposing criminal sanctions. On December 4, 2000, the magistrate court entered a 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce, severing the parties' marriage. On December 12, 2013, the 
parties submitted a "Stipulation for Entry of Judgment and Order Re: Modification." The 
"Judgment and Order Re: Modification" (hereinafter, "Judgment") was drafted by Ms. Shields's 
legal representatives at Ludwig, Shoufler, Miller, Johnson LLP and was entered February 21, 
2014. Paragraph nine of the Judgment states that the "Respondent shall continue to be entitled to 
claim all three (3) of the parties' minor children as her respective dependents for State and 
Federal income tax deduction purposes each year beginning [sic]." (Id. at 3.) 
On May 23, 2014, Jennifer Shields filed a motion and affidavit for contempt. In the 
"Affidavit of Jennifer L. Shields Re: Contempt," (hereinafter, "Affidavit") Ms. Shields claims 
that she "was awarded the state and federal dependency tax exemptions for all three (3) of our 
minor children." (Aff. at 2.) She further claims that paragraph nine of the above-mentioned 
Judgment continued to entitle her to claim the children for tax deduction purposes. (Id.) Ms. 
Shields then alleges that Mr. Jones "should be held in contempt for willfully, intentionally, and 
erroneously claiming our minor children on his 2013 Federal and/or State Income Tax Returns .. 
.. " (Id.) 
On October 29, 2014, a court trial was held on Ms. Shields's motion and affidavit for 
contempt. During Ms. Shields's presentation of evidence, the court admitted into evidence 
Respondent's Exhibits 1 (Judgment) and 2 (Stipulation for Entry of Judgment) with no objection 
offered by Mr. Jones. The court also admitted Respondent's Exhibit 4 (purported Idaho State 
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Tax Commission correspondence) over Mr. Jones's objections for lack of foundation or 
close of Ms. Shields's case-in-chief, Mr. Jones moved for 
involuntary dismissal of the charges pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 41 (b) on the 
grounds that Ms. Shields had failed to prove the right to relief based on the law and the facts 
adduced at hearing. The court denied the motion, finding the Ms. Shields had proved her claim 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Jones then testified and offered no exhibits. At the close of 
evidence, the court found Mr. Jones guilty of contempt for claiming the children on his Federal 
and State tax returns for the year 2013. The court imposed a criminal sanction of five days jail 
and a fine of $1,000, both of which were suspended for a period of two years. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred in affirming the trial court's determination that Mr. 
Jones violated the "Judgment and Order Re: Modification," which does not clearly 
and unequivocally enjoin the alleged misconduct? 
2. Whether the district court erred in holding harmless the trial court's admission of an 
unauthenticated document containing hearsay? 
3. Whether the district court erred in finding the contempt conviction was supported by 
substantial evidence when there was no evidence Mr. Jones engaged in the alleged 
misconduct after the allegedly violated order took effect? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine 
whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's 
findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from 
those findings. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow 
therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm 
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure. 
Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 858-859, 303 P.3d 214, 217-218 (2013) citing Bailey v. Bailey, 
153 Idaho 526, 529, 284 P .3d 970, 973 (2012) and Losser v. Bradstreet, l 45 Idaho 670, 672, 183 
P.3d 758, 760 (2008). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The Court the Appellant in Contempt Because the Allegedly-
Violated Provision the Judgment Fails to Clearly and Unequivocally Enjoin Mr. 
Jones from Claiming the Parties' Children as Dependents on Tax Returns. 
Ms. Shields alleged in her Affidavit that Ms. Jones violated the following provision of the 
Judgment: "EXEMPTIONS: Respondent shall continue to be entitled to claim all three (3) of the 
parties' minor children as her respective dependents for State and Federal income tax deductions 
purposes each year beginning [sic]." (Judgment, 3.) During cross-examination, Ms. Shields 
admitted that the provision entitling her to the tax exemptions fails to command Mr. Jones to do 
or refrain from doing anything. (2/3/2015 Tr. p.25, Ls.2-7.) Nonetheless, the trial court found 
Mr. Jones "guilty beyond a reasonable doubt [because] he violated the court order entered 
February 21, 2014 by willfully, intentionally and erroneously claiming the parties' minor 
children on his 2013 Federal and state Income Tax Returns .... " (Judgment and Order Re: 
Contempt, 1-2.) The court's first error in holding Mr. Jones in contempt was implicitly finding 
that the February 21, 2014 Judgment clearly and unequivocally prohibits Mr. Jones from 
engaging in the misconduct alleged by Ms. Shields. 
A The allegedly-violated provision in the Judgment 1s not a clear and unequivocal 
command of the court. 
To be found in contempt of court under Idaho Code§ 7-601(5) for "[d]isobedience of any 
lawful judgment, order or process of the court," the court document must actually command or 
enjoin specific conduct. Bald, Fat & Ugly, LLC v. Keane, 154 Idaho 807, 303 P.3d 166 (2013); 
Albrethson v. Ensign, 32 Idaho 687, 186 P. 911 (1920). In Keane, the district court entered an 
"Order Confirming Arbitration Awards" in favor of the petitioners' claims for a money judgment 
against the respondents. That document read, in part: 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: ... 
Bald Fat and Ugly LLC, have and recover from Richard A Keane and Lisa A 
Keane, husband ... a money judgment the sum of ONE HlJNDRED 
NINE THOUSAND HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO and 00/100 
DOLLARS ($159,762.00) under certain restrictions as set forth in the Arbitration 
Award, plus interest at eight percent (8%) from November 18, 2009. 
154 Idaho at 810, 303 P.3d at 169. The district court held the respondents in contempt for failing 
to pay the money awarded to the petitioner in the Order. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed 
the district court's finding of contempt because the Order "confirming the arbitration award did 
not order the [respondents] to do anything, [so] they could not be held in contempt for violating 
that order." Id. 
In reaching the conclusion that the judgment could not be enforced through the contempt 
power, the Court cited Albrethson v. Ensign, 32 Idaho 687, 186 P. 911 (1920), in which the 
petitioners were "awarded" the right to use the waters of the Big Wood River and its tributaries. 
The finding of contempt in that case-that the respondent had interfered with the petitioners' 
water rights-was reversed by the Supreme Court because the decree "did not command 
plaintiff, or anyone else, to do or to refrain from doing, anything, [and] disobedience of it [was] 
impossible." Id. at 691, 186 P. at 912. 
The bright-line rule under state and federal case law is that an order must clearly and 
unequivocally command or enjoin specific conduct to be enforced in with the contempt power. 
State v. Rice (In re Elliott), 145 Idaho 554, 556, 181 P.3d 480 (2008) citing United States v. 
Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 370-71, 70 S. Ct. 739 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The operative 
language in the Judgment referenced by Ms. Shields is difficult to distinguish from the 1909 
decree discussed in Albrethson, in which the parties were "awarded the right to the use of the 
waters of Big Wood River and its tributaries" 32 Idaho at 690. Here, Ms. Shields was "entitled" 
to claim the parties' children as her dependents for income tax deductions purposes. The 
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does not say anything about Mr. Jones and does not contain a clear and unequivocal 
HiHiUH'"· Disobedience of the provision was therefore impossible. 
Moreover, the provision does not clearly entitle Shields to the dependency exemptions 
for the 2013 tax year. The provision vaguely entitles her "to claim all three (3) of the parties' 
minor children as her respective dependents for State and Federal income tax deductions 
purposes each year beginning." (Judgment, 3.) (Emphasis added). Because this provision of the 
Judgment is not a clear and unequivocal command, it cannot be enforced in contempt 
proceedings. The district court therefore erred in affirming the magistrate's finding of contempt. 
B. The district court erred in affirming the conviction on a unalleged and unproven basis. 
Contempt proceedings brought in connection with a civil lawsuit are governed by I.R.C.P. 
75. Unless initiated by a judge's issuance of a "written charge of contempt," all non-summary 
contempt proceedings must commence with a motion and affidavit. I.R.C.P. 75(c)(2). The 
affidavit "must allege the specific facts constituting the alleged contempt." I.R.C.P. 75(c)(3). 
"Each instance of alleged contempt, if there is more than one, must be set forth separately." (Id.) 
"Where the affidavit fails to allege all essential, material facts, such deficiencies cannot be cured 
by proof supplied at the hearing." Whittle v. Seehusen, 113 Idaho 852, 857, 748 P.2d 1382, 1387 
(Ct. App. 1987). Moreover, "no inferences or presumptions may be indulged in to aid the 
sufficiency of the affidavit .... " First Sec. Bank, NA. v. Hansen, 107 Idaho 472,481,690 P.2d 
927, 936 (1984) (citations omitted). 
The district court seems to have affirmed the contempt conviction on a different theory than 
alleged by Ms. Shields. The district court is correct that the Judgment "includes the provision 
'Petitioner shall execute Form 8332 disclaiming the right to claim the children to Respondent 
within seven (7) days upon presentment[,]'" (Op. on Appeal, 5.) However, it was error for the 
district court to affirm the conviction due to the existence of this "subsequent order." (Id. at 4.) 
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problem is that Ms. Shields never alleged-and never proved-that Mr. Jones violated the 
"subsequent order" requiring him to execute IRS Form 8332 within seven days of presentment. 
upon a charge not made would be a sheer denial of due process." Carr v. Pridgen, 
157 Idaho 238,335 P.3d 578 (2014) (citation omitted). 
The record demonstrates that the "subsequent order," referenced twice by the district court, is 
absolutely irrelevant. When Ms. Shields's counsel attempted to elicit testimony on this subject, 
the trial court sustained Mr. Jones's objection. (2/3/2015 Tr. p.21, Ls.22-25 - p.23, Ls.1-13.) 
Ms. Shields's counsel then told the trial court that "[i]f we intended to file a separate count of 
contempt because he refused to execute the form as required, we would have done that." 
(2/3/2015 Tr. p.23, Ls. 3-6). Later, the court struck Ms. Shields's testimony that Mr. Jones did 
not execute the Form 8332. (2/3/2015 Tr. p.28, Ls. 4-25 -p.29, Ls.1-3.) 
The district court affirmed the finding of the magistrate court because "an award of the tax 
exemption to the respondent means that the appellant is prohibited from claiming it. Therefore, 
the judgment prohibited the appellant from claiming the minors as tax exemptions." (Op. on 
Appeal, 5.) (Emphasis added). Contempt proceedings afford no occasion to delve into the 
meaning of a plainly-worded court document. See, Terminal R. Ass 'n of St. Louis v. United 
States, 266 U.S. 17, 29, 45 S. Ct. 5, 8 (1924) (The acts or omissions proved at trial must 
"constitute a plain violation of the decree so read."). And while the district court held that 
"[b ]oth parties cannot legally claim the tax exemption for the minors[,]" (Op. on Appeal, 5) the 
same could be said for disputed water in Albrethson. The district court is not free to disregard 
the holding in that case. 
Legal entitlement is not the question here; the only question is whether Mr. Jones willfully 
violated a clear and unequivocal command of the court. He did not. Ms. Shields could have 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF- Page 6 
Jones failed to execute the IRS Form 8332 within seven days of presentment, 
not to do so. In Idaho, a court cannot convict a defendant contempt on a 
that which was alleged in petitioner's] affidavit .... " v. Pridgen, 157 
Idaho at 244, 335 P.3d at 584 (2014), and cannot hold a defendant in contempt for violating the 
"spirit" of a court document. 
II. The District Court Erred in Holding the Magistrate's Evidentiary Error 
"Harmless." 
A. The District Court correctlv found that the magistrate erred in admitting into evidence 
an unauthenticated document containing hearsay. 
1. The trial court failed to act consistently with applicable legal standards by 
admitting the document without requiring Ms. Shields to lay foundation for or 
authenticate Exhibit 4. 
The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to admit hearsay evidence 
under one of the exceptions, and this Court will not overturn an exercise of that 
discretion absent a clear showing of abuse. Whether the district court has abused 
its discretion is determined by examining: "(1) whether the court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the 
outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently within the applicable legal 
standards; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason." 
State v. Stanfield, 347 P.3d 175, 179 (Idaho 2015) (internal citations omitted). 
The Idaho Rules of Evidence provide that foundation or authentication can be 
demonstrated with or without extrinsic evidence. Proof of a public record can be established by 
"copy, certified as correct in accordance with Rule 902 or testified to be correct by a witness who 
has compared it with the original." I.R.E. 1005. Ms. Shields suggested that Exhibit 4 was a 
"public document"- perhaps implying that the Exhibit fell within the public record exception 
found at I.R.E. 1005. (2/3/2015 Tr. p.13, Ls.8-11.) However, Exhibit 4 was not certified in 
accordance with any of the subparts found in I.RE. 902. Ms. Shields also failed to call a witness 
to testify that Exhibit 4 had been compared with the original. The only foundation laid by Ms. 
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Shields for Exhibit 4 was her own testimony, which established: ) to whom the letter was 
and (2) that she (2/3/2015 p.1 11.) 
not work for the Idaho State Commission. (Tr. 
Shields admitted she 
- p.26, 1 so she could 
not be competent to testify that the letter was actually produced by or sent from the Idaho State 
Tax Commission. See, I.R.E. 602("A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is 
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the 
matter."). 
The court had insufficient evidence before it to conclude that the document was what Ms. 
Shields claimed it to be; therefore, the court erred in admitting Exhibit 4 over objections for lack 
of foundation or lack of authenticity. Cf State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 224 P.3d 480 (2009) 
(trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding two uncertified court orders where the 
defendant failed to comply with Idaho Rules of Evidence 1005 and 902). 
2. The trial court Jailed to act consistently with applicable legal standards by 
admitting the document without requiring Ms. Shields to lay foundation for an 
exception to the rule prohibiting hearsay. 
Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial, that is 
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. I.R.E. 801. Hearsay is generally inadmissible, 
I.R.E. 802, but there is an exception for statements "in any form of a public office or agency 
setting forth its regularly conducted and regularly recorded activities, or matters observed 
pursuant to duty imposed by law and as to which there was a duty to report .... " I.R.E. 803(8). 
The district court correctly found that Respondent's Exhibit 4 contains inadmissible hearsay 
and that Mr. Jones had objected on that basis. (See 2/3/2015 Tr. p.15, L.23.) Ms. Shields did not 
make an offer of proof to lay foundation for a hearsay exception; she merely submitted the issue 
to the court's discretion. (2/3/2015 Tr. p.17, Ls.6-7). The court erred, therefore, by admitting 
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Exhibit 4 over Mr. Jones's hearsay objection. Cf Herman v. Herman, 136 Idaho 781, 41 P.3d 
a public \-Vas (trial court properly determined that a letter 
inadmissible hearsay because there was no evidence demonstrate letter qualified as a public 
record). 
3. The trial court erred by admitting Respondent's Exhibit 4 without exercising 
reason. 
The trial court cannot be found to have reached its decision to admit Exhibit 4 based on an 
exercise ofreason. The court admitted Respondent's Exhibit 4 into evidence without addressing 
any of Mr. Jones's objections. Furthermore, Mr. Jones asked for the court's reasoning and the 
court declined to state the basis for overruling the objections. (2/3/2015 Tr. p.37, Ls.13-18). 
B. The district court erred in holding the trial court's error harmless. 
[A] judgment will not be reversed for an error in an evidentiary ruling "unless a 
substantial right of the party is affected . . . " I.R.E. 103. In a criminal case, 
therefore, error in the admission or exclusion of evidence will not result in a 
reversal if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 705, 889 P.2d 729, 734, (Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted). An 
evidentiary error is not harmless in a criminal case when the appellate court harbors a reasonable 
doubt that the finder of fact would have reached the same result had the error not occurred. See, 
State v. Burke, 110 Idaho 621, 628-29, 717 P.2d 1039, 1046-47 (Ct. App. 1986). In other words, 
an error will be considered harmless only "if the appellate court is 'convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the same result would have been reached had the evidence been properly 
excluded."' State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587, 597, 903 P.2d 752, 762 (Ct. App. 1995) (discussing 
alleged prosecutorial misconduct). 
The error in admitting Exhibit 4 into evidence was not harmless because the Respondent 
offered no other evidence, apart from Ms. Shields's speculation, to explain why her claimed tax 
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deductions were denied. be clear, Ms. Shields testified that her dependency tax deductions 
for 3 tax claimed " 5 p.23, 
later admitted, however, that she had absolutely no personal knowledge as to whether 
Mr. Jones even filed taxes for 2013. (2/3/2015 Tr. p.25, Ls.8-17). Ms. Shields also testified that 
she did not work at the Idaho State Tax Commission or the Internal Revenue Service. (2/3/2015 
Tr. p.26, Ls.1-6.) Clearly, the only basis for her testimony that Mr. Jones claimed the 
dependency tax deductions was the inadmissible statement in Exhibit 4 that the "additional 
exemption(s) and grocery credit(s)" she claimed were denied "because they were already 
allowed on another return." 
After the close of Ms. Shields's presentation of evidence, Mr. Jones moved for involuntary 
dismissal, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 4l(b). (2/3/2015 Tr. p.29, Ls.24-25 -p.30, Ls.1-5.) 
The error in admitting Exhibit 4 was not harmless because, when Mr. Jones moved for dismissal, 
the only evidence before the court that Mr. Jones actually engaged in the misconduct was the 
statement contained in Exhibit 4. Without the unauthenticated letter, the court could have only 
speculated as to why Ms. Shields's dependency tax deduction claims were rejected. With 
Exhibit 4, however, the court could infer that the dependency exemption claims were denied 
because "they were already allowed on another return," conclude that the exemptions had been 
claimed by Mr. Jones, and deny his motion to dismiss. 
III. The District Court Erred in Finding the Magistrate Had Substantial Evidence 
Necessary to Convict the Mr. Jones of Contempt. 
"Contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense." Camp v. E. Fork Ditch Co., 137 Idaho 850, 
861, 55 P.3d 304,315 (2002) (quoting Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194,201, 88 S. Ct. 1477, 1481 
(1968)). "[C]riminal penalties may not be imposed on someone who has not been afforded the 
protections that the Constitution requires of such criminal proceedings." Id. (quoting Hicks v. 
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Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 632, 108 S. Ct. 1423, 1429-30 (1988)). In order for the court to impose 
sanctions proceedings, "the trier of fact must find that all of the elements of 
contempt were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. I.R.C.P. 75G)(2). 
An accused's right to demand proof beyond a reasonable doubt is of "surpassing importance," 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476-77, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2402 (2000) and a bedrock 
constitutional principle. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1072 (1970). 
When a criminal action has been tried to a court sitting without a jury, appellate 
review of sufficiency of the evidence is limited to ascertaining whether there is 
substantial evidence upon which the court could have found that the prosecution 
met its burden of proving the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
State v. Wright, 154 Idaho 157, 158, 295 P.3d 1016, 1017 (Ct. App. 2013) (citations omitted). 
"Evidence is regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it 
in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proved." State v. A1itchell, 130 Idaho 
134, 937 P.2d 960 (Ct. App. 1997). "The challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is not 
based on a technical or subtle defect. The defense simply says that there was not enough 
admissible evidence to convict the defendant." State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 877, 908 P.2d 
566, 570 (Ct. App. 1995). 
A. There is no substantial evidence that Mr. Jones claimed the child dependency tax 
exemptions after the Judgment was entered on February 21, 2014. 
The district court found that the trial court had substantial evidence supporting its finding 
of contempt because Mr. Jones admitted that he filed his taxes. (Op. on Appeal, 8.) Specifically, 
the court relied on Mr. Jones's statement that "I filed my taxes a month after I received notice of 
that." (2/3/2015 Tr. p.47, Ls. 24-25.) However, Mr. Jones testified seconds earlier that he 
received notice that the dependency exemptions had been awarded to Ms. Shields one month 
after he filed his tax returns: 
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Q. [Mr. Shoufler] So, you were on notice in 
exemptions were not yours to claim; correct? 
[Mr. Jones] They- I was notified of that. 
and again in 2013, that the 
Shoufler] Okay. Not m 1 again l 
[Mr. Jones] A month after the fact that I filed taxes, yes, I was. 
(2/3/2015 Tr. p.47, Ls. 14-21.) 
During direct examination, Mr. Jones testified that he filed his 2013 taxes in January of 2014. 
(Id. p.41, Ls. 7-8.) The weight of the evidence before the court was that Mr. Jones filed his 2013 
taxes in January of 2014-at least thirty days before the allegedly-violated Judgment came into 
existence. 
The district court erred in affirming a conviction for "willful" contempt of a court order, when 
the evidence shows that the alleged misconduct took place before the court order even existed. It 
is impossible to indifferently disregard a court-imposed duty until the duty exists. See, In re 
Weick, 142 Idaho 275, 127 P.3d 178 (2005) (defining "willful" for contempt proceedings under 
I.C. §7-601(5)). By holding Mr. Jones in contempt for filing his taxes in January, 2014, the court 
enforced the February 21 Judgment in a retroactive manner, and by imposing criminal sanctions, 
the court essentially violated the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws. U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; Idaho Const. art. I, § 16. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court erred in affirming the conviction for contempt because, (1) the provision of 
the Judgment allegedly violated does not clearly and unequivocally enjoin the alleged 
misconduct; (2) the magistrate's error in admitting an unauthenticated letter containing hearsay 
was not harmless, and (3) there was no evidence before the court that Mr. Jones engaged in the 
alleged misconduct after the February 21 Judgment took effect. 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Jones respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district 
court's decision affirming the conviction for contempt, and vacate the magistrate's award of 
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attorney fees. Mr. Jones also respectfully requests that costs be awarded pursuant to LC.§ 7-610 
so that costs of the appeal are not borne entirely by the public. Mr. Jones also the 
to present oral argument. 
·---'~ Respectfully submitted this:2 day of November, 2015. 
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